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Summary
The reproducibility crisis, that is, the fact that many scientific results are difficult to replicate, 
pointing to their unreliability or falsehood, is a hot topic in the recent scientific literature, and 
statistical methodologies, testing procedures and p-values, in particular, are at the centre of the 
debate. Assessment of the extent of the problem–the reproducibility rate or the false discovery 
rate–and the role of contributing factors are still an open problem. Replication experiments, that 
is, systematic replications of existing results, may offer relevant information on these issues. We 
propose a statistical model to deal with such information, in particular to estimate the 
reproducibility rate and the effect of some study characteristics on its reliability. We analyse data 
from a recent replication experiment in psychology finding a reproducibility rate broadly coherent 
with other assessments from the same experiment. Our results also confirm the expected role of 
some contributing factor (unexpectedness of the result and room for bias) while they suggest that 
the similarity between original study and the replica is not so relevant, thus mitigating some 
criticism directed to replication experiments.
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1 Introduction
A number of authors have recently cast doubt on the reliability of published scientific results, 
arguing that a high number of scientific findings are false or hardly reproducible (Leek & Peng, 
2015b; 2015a; Nuzzo, 2014), the fact that a relevant ‘crisis of reproducibility’ is experienced 
nowadays is an opinion shared by the large majority of researcher interviewed by Nature in a 
recent survey (Baker, 2016).
These criticisms are directed at results based on a commonplace paradigm–or ‘ritual’ as 
Gigerenzer (2004) provocatively called it–which roughly goes as follows: a confirmation of a 
theory, meaning here the existence of a relationship between an outcome and a factor, is gener-
ally claimed whenever a null hypothesis of absence of the relationship is statistically rejected, 
the observed significance level (p-value) being a measure of the support given by the data to 
the theory. The central role of statistical hypotheses testing, and p-values in particular, has lead 
to pinpointing it as one of the main culprits (McCloskey, 1995; Goodman, 1999a; Cohen, 
1994), reviving an old controversy (Krantz, 1999) and prompting the recent ASA statement on 
the correct use of p-values (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Some scholars (Leek & Peng, 2015a; 
Gigerenzer, 2004) have argued that the problem lies with the paradigm itself rather than the
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p-value specifically, although it is possible that the use of statistical testing as a way to draw 
conclusions may worsen things by masking phenomena due to researcher bias (loosely speak-
ing the more or less conscious manipulation of data to obtain a given result, see Section 2). The 
statistical methodology is often seen both as part of the problem and as a mean to improve the 
situation by respondents to the Nature survey (Baker, 2016). In fact, a number of proposals have 
been put forward to substitute hypotheses testing with alternative methods, for example, Bayes 
factors (Goodman, 1999b) or measures of prediction error within a model selection framework 
(Reiss, 2015; Wagenmakers, 2007). At present, however, there is no clear consensus on whether 
these alternatives are preferable to hypotheses testing.
We will not discuss further the epistemological aspects of the issue or whether the p-value 
is to be blamed; rather, we focus on the empirical evidence concerning the reliability of results 
obtained by means of the paradigm, where by reliability, we refer to the false discovery rate 
(FDR) or the rate of reproducibility.
The idea of a FDR across science (or a discipline) is intuitively clear, and it is undoubtedly 
relevant to assessing reliability of ‘science’. [It also dates back a long time, it is reported that the 
so-called 5� threshold, which is used in physics as a critical level of significance, stems from 
a reasoning based on the number of hypotheses tested in the scientific literature at that time 
(1968) and the expected number of discoveries with a lower threshold (Demortier, 2010).] On 
the contrary, it is rather difficult to define such a FDR on formal grounds due to the difficulties 
in defining a population of scientific findings on which it should be measured and also to the 
difficulties in identifying the false ones. (It is also an ill-posed problem in statistical terms 
as hypotheses testing is not designed to control it; the discussion, however, goes beyond the 
statistical methodology, and so this consideration is insufficient to dismiss the issue.)
When experimental results are considered, the idea of a deceitful result is made more concrete 
by looking at lack of reproducibility, that is, whether, upon replication of the experiment, it 
leads to a different conclusion. The two concepts of falsity and lack of reproducibility of a result 
do not equate, as a different conclusion from a replica experiment may well be compatible with 
the conclusion of the first when it comes to statistical conclusions. However, it is reasonable to 
see lack of reproducibility as an indicator of reliability [if not a proxy for falsity (Prinz et al., 
2011; Begley & Ellis, 2012)] as is discussed more thoroughly in Section 3.
Despite the difficulties in defining the concepts, there have been various attempts at assess-
ing the reliability of scientific literature either in terms of FDR (Section 2) or of rate of 
reproducibility (Section 3).
We will not discuss here the assessments not directly based on empirical evidence, that is, 
those where theoretical calculations are performed obtaining hypothetical FDRs based on some 
assumption on the proportion of false hypotheses tested and the procedure employed to confirm 
a discovery (Ioannidis, 2005b; Berger, 2003).
Empirical assessments stem from examining a set of results (usually from published papers 
belonging to some more or less specific field). Because the set of studies is typically (forcibly) 
chosen according to criteria that do not allow for generalisation beyond the set itself, finding 
a high FDR or low reproducibility does not necessarily indicate that the results in the field 
are unreliable. Still, it is a relevant information: at the very least, the conclusions apply to 
those results that have been examined and those may be relevant per se. Furthermore, a lack 
of reliability within the sample of results is suggestive of the fact that the paradigm used to 
provide those result may be problematic. In other words, we can not generalise the supposedly 
high FDR or low reproducibility rate to the field, but it may be evidence that the paradigm that 
has been used is capable of leading to a high FDR or low reproducibility rate.
Besides the generalisation problem, even drawing conclusions on the sample itself is not 
straightforward due to the aforementioned difficulties in identifying false results and the fact
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that reproducibility is not clearly defined when statistical conclusions are involved. We review 
some proposals, and the issues involved, in Sections 2 and 3, the former being more focused 
on FDR assessments, the latter on rate of reproducibility. It is worth to note that none of these 
attempts at quantifying the extent of the issue is concerned with those disciplines where the 
number of variables dominates the sample size and one would expect the problem to be even 
worse. In fact, this is a difficult context in which the statistical techniques involved are slightly 
less conventional and, to some extent, do allow for multiple testing. However, many authors 
argue, qualitatively and anecdotally, that this is a relevant issue, for example, in genetics (Ioan-
nidis et al., 2001; Hunter & Kraft, 2007; Callaway, 2017; Eaves, 2006) and neuroimaging (Vul 
& Pashler, 2012; Vul et al., 2009).
We then focus on analysis of reproducibility, in particular, we consider data from a study in 
which replication was attempted for a hundred published experiments in psychology (Open Sci-
ence Collaboration, 2015), and we propose (in Section 4) a model for the experimental results, 
summarised by the respective p-values, to estimate the reproducibility rate and to assess the 
relevance of some characteristics of the original results and the replica that may affect repro-
ducibility. Because a major difficulty in analysing this kind of data is specifying a probability 
distribution for p-values under the alternative hypotheses (and even under the null in certain 
circumstances as discussed in Section 4), we perform a simulation study (Section 5) to assess 
robustness of our model specification, also with respect to alternatives.
2 Empirical Evidence on the Reliability of Scientific Results
One of the purported reasons for the lack of reproducibility of published results is related 
to the fact that the original result (p-value) does not come from a single pre-specified test but 
is one (the lowest) among the p-values obtained by the experimenter who performs a number 
of tests exploring different theories/hypotheses. This phenomenon, called p-hacking (selective 
reporting), may easily lead to low p-values in the absence of a signal. Moreover, a similar 
phenomenon may occur even when a single, maybe pre-specified, hypothesis is tested, but the 
researcher has a number of degrees of freedom in defining the details of the analysis (e.g. 
inclusion/exclusion of variables or observations), and the choices are driven by the data. This 
was named the Garden of Forking Paths (GOFP) by Gelman and Loken (2014) (an example is 
given by the recoding of variables we did for the present analysis, see Table 2). Simonsohn et 
al. (2014) noted that the shape of the frequency distribution of the p-values from a sample of 
studies may allow to gain insights on the extent of phenomena such as p-hacking and GOFP 
and hence on the reliability. For example, a prevalence of p-values just below 0.05, which is 
coherent with the p-hacking and GOFP phenomena, has been observed within biology (Head 
et al., 2015), economics (Brodeur et al., 2016) and psychology (Masicampo & Lalande, 2012). 
The approach of Simonsohn et al. (2014) is quite indirect, in terms of reliability assessment, 
in that they seek for patterns that reveal the existence of a problem. Jager and Leek (2014) take a 
more direct (and audacious) approach and employ methods from genomics to estimate the rate 
of false discoveries in medical journals. They collect a sample of 5 322 p-values less than 0.05 
from five medical journals from 2010 to 2015 and model them according to a mixture of a uni-
form distribution in Œ0; 0:05�, which is the distribution of the p-value under the null hypotheses, 
and a beta distribution, truncated at 0.05, which is a plausible model, according to the litera-
ture, for the behaviour of a set of p-value under the alternative hypotheses. The estimate of the 
weight of the first component of the mixture (14% ˙ 1%) is then taken as an estimate of the 
FDR. The task that Jager and Leek (try to) accomplish is rather difficult and ambitious, and a 
number of criticisms have been raised concerning their methods and assumptions (see the dis-
cussion of the cited paper). One relevant issue is that, in order to get a relatively big sample,
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automatic text mining methods have been used to collect the p-values; thus, there is no distinc-
tion between primary and secondary findings, and when multiple p-values are scraped from 
the same paper, there is no control over correlation between them: moreover, and more gener-
ally, the criteria for inclusion in the study include typographical characteristic, which may bias 
the results in unpredictable ways (Goodman, 2014). Also, Gelman and O’Rourke (2014) point 
out that p-values have a uniform distribution under the null only in ideal settings and likely 
not when the p-values may suffer from phenomena of p-hacking or GOFP. It is also dubious 
whether a common distribution is adequate to describe the behaviour of the p-values when the 
null is false, because the sample includes p-values from an (uncontrolled) variety of situations 
with different signal strengths and different types of tests.
3 Assessing the Reliability through Replication
The idea of assessing the reliability of a finding by trying to reproduce it, that is, by repli-
cating the experiment that lead to that finding, is straightforward and central to the scientific 
method, although there are very limited incentives for researchers to do so. On the other hand, 
a perfect replication of an experiment is seldom possible, even when enough information on 
materials and methods of the original experiment are given and both sufficient expertise and 
suitable resources are available (Schwalbe, 2016), so any conclusion should allow for the non-
perfect replica (Kaiser, 2015; Yong, 2012). Furthermore, even if a perfect replica is performed, 
inasmuch as the results of the original studies are given in statistical terms, that is, the theory 
under scrutiny does not offer a precise prediction of the experimental results, it is not clear 
what a failure to reproduce the conclusion means, as the fact that a second study accepts the 
(same) null is not necessarily a contradiction (Simonsohn et al., 2013) because ‘The differ-
ence between significant and not significant is not itself statistically significant’ (Gelman & 
Stern, 2006). Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties, replicating a sample of experiments in 
a field may shed light on the reliability of discoveries from that field or on the characteristics of 
experiments which may affect reliability.
In a paper that sparkled the recent debate, Ioannidis (2005a) considered 49 highly cited clin-
ical research studies and sought for replications in the literature: of the 46 studies claiming an 
effect, 11 were unchallenged, 7 were contradicted and for other 7, the initial estimate of effect 
was reduced. Other authors have discussed the rate of reproducibility in medical science finding 
rate of confirmation as low as 11% (Begley & Ellis, 2012), although in pre-clinical research, 
which is a difficult area; 20  25% in the pharmaceutical context [where false discoveries may 
also have financial consequences when the objective is to evaluate a pharmaceutical company 
based (also) on the research behind its strategy (Osherovich, 2011)].
More pro-actively, initiatives aimed at trying to replicate existing studies are in place in 
medicine both by pharmaceutical companies and by academic researchers (Kaiser, 2015; 
Errington et al., 2014; Mobley et al., 2013), in economics (Camerer et al., 2016) and in psy-
chology (Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The OSC (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015) considered a (more or less) random sample of papers from three leading 
journals (one general purpose and two discipline-specific), within the cognitive and social-
personality sub-disciplines. The selection of papers was driven by a compromise between 
generalisability of reproducibility estimate and the feasibility of the replica experiments. For 
each study, the OSC attempted reproduction of the (main) result. Each experiment was repli-
cated by testing a single, predetermined, effect, thus leaving no (or very little) room to 
p-hacking or GOFP phenomena. Observed significance levels of the original studies and the 
corresponding replicas are reported in Figure 1. The relationship between the two p-values 
appears relatively weak unless the p-values are very low (well below the 0.05 threshold). As
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Figure 1. Open Science Collaboration replication experiment: p-values from original studies and replicas compared (94
studies) on natural (left panel) and transformed scale (right panel).
Table 1. Assessment of reproducibility rate within the OSC study.
Number of studies 100
Replications with significant results 36%
Original effect size within 95% CI of the replica 47%
Subjectively rated as successful replications 39%
Significant combining data from original study and replica 68%
CI, confidence interval; OSC, Open Science Collaboration.
Table 2. Additional informations on the studies replicated within the OSC analysis
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), original scale and modified scale for the present
analysis.
Description (name in model)
Values
Original (Freq) Modified
Opportunity for researcher No (45) 1
expectations to influence Slight (32) 2














Some what similar (4)
³
1
Similarity between original Moderately similar (8)
and replica (s) Very similar (22) 2
Extremely similar (38) 3
Virtually identical (22) 4
 Originally on a continuous scale, rounded to the nearest integer as a first step.
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outlined previously, it is not straightforward to determine if a replication is successful, so the
authors report different plausible evaluations of the reproduction rate that range from 36% to
68% (Table 1).
The OSC inquiry has been criticised on the grounds that the replications may differ from the
original studies because the sample in the replication study was drawn from a different popu-
lation (e.g. a study on Americans was replicated drawing a sample from Italian population) or
because the procedure was different (e.g. a different stimuli was considered), and these differ-
ences may decrease the rate of successful replication (Gilbert et al., 2016). This is admittedly
(Anderson et al., 2016) a limitation of any analysis based on replication, and there is an obvious
trade-off between the accuracy with which each experiment can be replicated and the number
of experiments that can be replicated. An attempt at mitigating this issue was in fact made by
considering an indicator of similarity between the original study and the replica (see Table 2).
Furthermore, Gilbert et al. (2016) argue that performing a single attempt at reproducing the
results of a study amounts to a low power procedure. While it is intuitively true that a low power
replica is less likely to reproduce an actual signal, it is unclear whether using a more powerful
technique in the replication is susceptible to lead to a significantly higher reproducibility rate
(Anderson et al., 2016). Ongoing replication projects such as Klein et al. (2014, 2015) may
help shedding more light on this issue.
Finally, a major limit of the assessments of reliability, fully acknowledged by the OSC, is that
it is not clear to what extent the results can be generalised; the population is poorly defined, and
the sampling strategy is far from being a random sample.
4 A Bayesian Mixture Model for the Open Science Collaboration Studies
Despite the limitations that an inquiry such as that of the OSC may have, we believe that it
contains relevant information, and so we discuss possible modelling strategies to learn from the
data that were produced. We propose a model for the p-values arising from the original results
and the replicas with the aim of assessing the reproducibility rate and also of investigating
whether some characteristics of the studies are associated with how likely they are to reproduce.
In particular, we use a mixture model, similar to the one proposed by Jager and Leek (2014),
in which each pair of p-values (original and replica) comes from a mixture distribution were
one component describes the p-value behaviour under the null hypothesis while the second
corresponds to it being false. Because the original studies all claimed a significant result, the
weight given to the second component of the mixture can be seen as a reproducibility rate.
Let then pij represent the outcome (p-value) for experiment i D 1; : : : ; n in the original
study (j D 1) and in the replication (j D 2). We transform the p-values on a Gaussian scale by
letting yij D ˆ1.1�pij / and model yij as a mixture of aN.0; 1/ with probability .1��/ and
a N.�i ; 1/ with probability � , both truncated for yi1 to allow for the fact that yi1 is censored
because we consider only studies for which the p-value is below a certain threshold. The density
for the pair .yi1; yi2/ is then
f .yi1; yi2j�;/ D .1 � �/�.yi1/
p
�.yi2/C � �.yi1 � �i /�.yi2 � �i /
1 �ˆ.ˆ1.1 � p/ � �i / ; (1)
for i D 1; : : : ; n, where  p D max¹pi1 W i D 1; : : : ; nº is the maximum p-value among the
studies of the sample. We also assume that �i Ï N.�;  �2/ and �; � Ï hN.0; 100/ (half normal
with parameters 0, 100), � Ï Unif.0; 1/. Estimation is performed using STAN (Carpenter et 
al., 2017; Stan Development Team, 2016) within R (R Core Team, 2015), and results are based
on four parallel chains of length 5 000.
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We note in pass that the model assumes that the distribution of the p-value is the same in
the original experiment and the replica (but for the truncation), which is reasonable because
in the OSC study, the experiments were repeated in the same settings; however, it would be
possible to generalise the model to allow for differences, for instance, if the original and replica
had different power, this could be allowed for by specifying a different variance in the two
distributions of the second part of the mixture.
The first component of the mixture, which assumes a uniformly distributed p-value,
describes the behaviour of the test when the null hypothesis is true in the ideal situation where
no p-hacking or GOFP are in place. In principle, these assumptions are reasonably tenable for
the replication but are disputable for the test performed in the original study. The second com-
ponent assumes some deviation (expressed by the parameter �i ) from the null. This is a broad
approximation, because the testing statistics involved in the studies are different and do not
have the same behaviour under the alternative (see the discussion on this issue in Section 5).
These considerations make the parameters �i , �, � difficult to interpret.
Keeping into account the aforementioned limits, one may interpret the parameter � as the rate
of successful replication. The posterior distribution for � is reported in the first panel of Figure 2
and suggests a value between 50% and 60%. With respect to the conclusion of the OSC, this
figure may be loosely compared with the rate of significant results obtained by combining the
original and replicated studies (last line of Table 1).
The OSC data also include some characteristics of the studies that may be associated to their
reliability, in particular, we consider three of them, all subjectively rated by the OSC researcher,
reported in Table 2. The opportunity for researcher expectations to influence results (bi ) is
related to the extent to which p-hacking or GOFP may affect the test result in the original
study. A surprising result (ri ) may be seen as less likely to be true. Finally, a lack of similarity
between the original study and the replication (si ) may introduce random error and lead to a
lower reproducibility rate (Gilbert et al., 2016).
In order to explore to what extent these characteristics of the studies affect reproducibility,
we specify a model in which the parameter �i is allowed to vary depending on them. Let then
f .yi1; yi2j�;�/ D .1 � �i /�.yi1/
p
�.yi2/C �i �.yi1 � �i /�.yi2 � �i /






D ˛ C ˇbi C �ri C ısi ; (3)
where the triplet ˇ has a prior distribution such that ˇ=
P
ˇj is uniformly distributed on ¹ˇ WP
ˇj D 0º and Pˇj Ï N.0; 10/. In other words, we impose a sum-to-zero constraint on
Figure 2. Posterior distributions for � , �, �.
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Figure 3. Posterior distributions for the coefficients ˛, ˇ, � and ı, segments represent 95% and 80% high posterior density
credibility intervals, white dots represent the medians.
the ˇi . The same prior distribution is specified for the triplet � and the quadruplet ı. Finally,
˛ Ï N.0; 10/.
The posterior distributions for the coefficients (Figure 3) show that a low opportunity for
experimenter bias leads to a higher � , while a more surprising result is associated to a lower
� . The degree of similarity between the original study and the replica seems not to affect the
mixing parameter.
5 Model Robustness
We discuss three of our model assumptions that may be deemed dubious: the uniform distri-
bution may not describe the behaviour of the p-value under the null if some form of p-hacking 
is present (as it is possible in the original experiment); p-values arising from different model 
structures may have different behaviours under the alternative hypotheses while we assume a 
common distribution (differing only because of the mean); and normality of ˆ1.1  p/ under 
the alternative is not necessarily the optimal choice.
Different specifications could be used both under the null and under the alternative.
The assumption of a uniform distribution under the null does not allow for p-hacking/GOFP 
phenomena; however, the very nature of such phenomena, which are not precisely defined, 
makes it difficult to envisage an alternative distributional assumption to allow for them.
As far as the distribution of the statistics under the alternative hypotheses is concerned, we 
already mentioned in Section 4 that different test statistics may show different behaviours 
under the alternative. In general, a sensible option would be to use a more flexible specification 
for their distribution, for example, Jager and Leek (2014) mention the possibility of using a 
mix-ture of Beta distributions, but a non-parametric specification could also be used. An 
alternative strategy would be to model the differences, that is, diversify the second component 
depending on the test statistics. In the present analysis, the relative paucity of the sample and 
the fact that it involves a wide range of different test statistics (the studies in the OSC included 
analysis of variance with various designs, analysis of covariance, t -tests, �2 tests, correlation 
and regres-sion models with various specifications) deter us from employing the 
aforementioned strategies: the sample is not big enough to estimate a more flexible model, and 
differentiating with respect to the test statistic would require a non-trivial assessment of which 
groups may be described by a common distribution.
Our approach is then to assess robustness of our results to the violations of these assump-
tions by means of a small simulation study. Our aim is to simulate a sample of (pairs of)
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p-values using a mechanism that resembles the way in which p-values are produced from actual
experiments and that does not guarantee the validity of the aforementioned assumptions.
A pair of simulated p-values (original and replication experiments) is obtained by simulat-
ing two independent samples according to a given model and performing a test on both. The
simulation, either under the null hypotheses or under a model within the alternative, is per-
formed conditional on the first p-value being below 0.05. In order to mimic the p-hacking
phenomenon, the simulations under the null were performed drawing the p-value from the
original experiment as a minimum of 10 uniformly distributed p-values. (Note that the afore-
mentioned procedure may be simplified by simulating directly the test statistics or even the
p-value when its distribution is known under the null or alternative, the procedure is explained
here in an easily generalisable form.)
We simulate samples of p-value pairs repeating the aforementioned procedure with varying
proportions of true nulls. Within each sample, different data generating mechanisms are used
in order to allow for the variability in the p-value distribution under the alternative hypothesis.
In particular, in the simulations, we consider analysis of variance models with varying group
numbers, sizes and signal strength.
On each sample, we estimate model (1) as well as two alternative specifications for the p-
value when the null is false: a beta distribution with parameters a and b as in Jager and Leek
(2014) and a Gaussian distribution for  log.p-value/ as suggested by Cox (2014) (see also
Boos & Stefanski, 2012).
The posterior distributions of � obtained using the three alternative specifications are com-
pared with the true proportion of null hypotheses in Figure 4, all models perform reasonably
well, with a slight advantage for the Gaussian specification.
(a) (b) (c)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4. Posterior distribution of the mixing parameter under different scenarios: (a) Gaussian distribution of ˆ1.p/;
(b) Beta distribution for p; (c) Gaussian distribution for log.p/; top row: average group size 100 observations, bottom row: 
average group size 10 observations.
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6 Discussion
Replication experiments such as the Open Science Collaboration (2015) one can be a valu-
able tool to investigate the reliability of scientific results and of the paradigm, which is used to
reach them. However, it is not obvious how to interpret the data coming from such experiments.
We proposed a model to estimate the reproducibility rate for the Open Science Collaboration
(2015) sample of studies and to assess the effect of some characteristics of the studies on their
reliability (as measured by reproducibility of results). Our analysis confirms that the more room
there is for experimenter bias to influence outcomes, the less reproducible are the results, thus
suggesting that p-hacking may in fact hinder the reliability of scientific conclusions. More-
over, the fact that the closeness of the replication to the original study have no association to
the reproduction rate weakens some objections that have been moved against replication exper-
iments (at least as far as the OSC study under scrutiny is concerned and keeping in mind that
the closeness is subjectively rated).
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